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Abstract. Under some circumstances, a group of individuals may need
to negotiate together as a negotiation team against another party. Unlike
bilateral negotiation between two individuals, this type of negotiations
entails to adopt an intra-team strategy for negotiation teams in order to
make team decisions and accordingly negotiate with the opponent. It is
crucial to be able to negotiate successfully with heterogeneous opponents
since opponents’ negotiation strategy and behavior may vary in an open
environment. While one opponent might collaborate and concede over
time, another may not be inclined to concede. This paper analyzes the
performance of recently proposed intra-team strategies for negotiation
teams against different categories of opponents: competitors, matchers,
and conceders. Furthermore, it provides an extension of the negotiation
tool Genius for negotiation teams in bilateral settings. Consequently,
this work facilitates research in negotiation teams.
Keywords: Negotiation Teams, Collective Decision Making, Agreement
Technologies
1 Introduction
A negotiation team is a group of two or more interdependent individuals that
join together as a single negotiation party because they share some common
goals related to the negotiation at hand [30,5]. This kind of party participates
in many real life situations like the negotiation between a married couple and a
house seller, the negotiation between a group of traveling friends and a booking
agency, and the negotiation between two or more organizations. Despite acting
as a single party, most of the time negotiation teams cannot be considered as
a unitary player. As a matter of fact, team members may have different and
conflicting preferences that need to be conciliated when making a team decision
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regarding the negotiation. Agent-based negotiation teams (ABNT) constitutes
a novel topic of research in automated negotiation, where efforts in the last few
years focused mostly on bilateral and multiparty negotiations with unitary play-
ers [8,13,9]. Mechanisms that allow ABNT to take decisions on the negotiation
process, namely intra-team strategies or team dynamics [24,23], are needed in
order to support multi-agent systems for complex applications like group travel
markets, group buying in electronic commerce, and negotiations between agent
organizations (e.g., organizational merging). An intra-team strategy for a spe-
cific negotiation protocol (e.g., alternating bilateral negotiation protocol) defines
what decisions are taken by the negotiation team, and how and when those de-
cisions are taken.
Although there are some studies investigating negotiation among team mem-
bers [29], automated negotiation between a team and an opponent is open to re-
search. Sanchez-Anguix et al. have proposed several intra-team strategies [24,23]
for ABNT following the alternating-offers protocol in a bilateral setting. The
proposed intra-team strategies have been studied under different environmental
conditions to assess the most appropriate intra-team strategy with respect to
the given environmental setting [24]. However, several assumptions regarding
the opponent exist. For instance, it is assumed that the opponent employs a
time-based concession tactics such as Boulware or Conceder[7] in a cooperative
context. Nevertheless, these assumptions might become inconsistent with some
opponents in open and dynamic environment. For instance, an opponent may
adopt a strategy like “take it or leave it” while another opponent may choose
to observe other negotiating agent’s behavior and concede accordingly. An im-
mediate question is which intra-team strategies will negotiate well against other
types of opponents different than those using time-based tactics.
Without a doubt, an opponent’s negotiation attitude may affect on the per-
formance of intra-team strategies. Opponent’s behavior is not limited to classic
time-based concession strategies. Baarslag et al. classify the negotiation strate-
gies according to their negotiation behavior against the opponent into four cate-
gories [3]. These are inverters, conceders, competitors and matchers. Conceders
always concede regardless of the opponent’s strategy, while competitors do not
yield independently of the behavior shown by opponents. A matcher mimics its
opponent’s behavior while inverter inverts it. When the opponent concedes, the
matcher would concede accordingly while the inverter would not. Based on this
classification, we investigate how intra-team strategies proposed in the literature
perform against opponents belonging to different families of negotiation strate-
gies. To do this, we extend Genius [14] to allow negotiation teams and enable it
to perform bilateral negotiations between a team (a group of agents) and an in-
dividual agent. The contributions of this paper do not solely focus on the study
of intra-team strategies’ performance against different types of opponent, but
we also describe how Genius has been modified to support such negotiations.
This extension will allow researchers to (i) design and test domain independent
intra-team strategies, which is desirable given the increasing number of applica-
tion domains for automated negotiation; (ii) engage negotiation teams in open
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environments where any kind of opponent behavior is possible; (iii) make use of
a wide repository of negotiation domains, utility functions, and automated nego-
tiators; (iv) focus on the design of intra-team strategies, while leaving simulation
aspects to be governed by Genius.
Our contributions are two-folds. First, we extend Genius to support ABNT;
thus Genius can facilitate research on ABNT. Second, we analyze the per-
formance of different intra-team strategies proposed by Sanchez-Anguix et al.
against different types of heterogeneous opponents. The rest of this paper is
organized as follows. First, we present our general framework. After that, we
briefly introduce the intra-team strategies analyzed in this paper. Then, we de-
scribe how the extension has been included inside the Genius framework. Then,
we describe how the experiments were carried out and present and discuss the
results of the experiments. Finally, we describe our future work and briefly con-
clude this work.
2 General Framework
In our framework, one negotiation team is involved in a negotiation with an
opponent. Independently of whether or not the other party is also a team, both
parties interact with each other by means of the alternating-offers protocol. Team
dynamics or intra-team strategies define what decisions have to be taken by a
negotiation team, how those decisions are taken, and when those decisions are
taken. In a bilateral negotiation between a team and an opponent, the decisions
that must be taken are which offers are sent to the opponent, and whether or not
opponent’s offers are accepted. A general view of our framework is represented
in Fig. 1. Dashed lines depict communications inside the team, while others
represent communications with the opponent.
A team A is formed by a team mediator TMA and team members ai. The
team mediator communicates with the other party following the alternating of-
fers protocol and team members communicate with the team mediator. Com-
munications between the team and the opponent are carried out by means of
the team mediator. This mediator sends team decisions to the opponent and
receives, and later broadcasts, decisions from the opponent to team members.
Thus, the fact that the opponent is communicating with a team is not known
by the opponent, which only interacts with the trusted mediator. In this frame-
work, the mechanisms employed by the team to decide on which offers to send
and whether or not accept offers are carried out during the negotiation process
itself. How these decisions are taken depends on the specific intra-team strategy
that is implemented by the team and the team mediator. Each team media-
tor can implement its own intra-team protocol to coordinate team members as
long as team members know how to play such intra-team protocol. It should be
noted that we assume that team membership remains static during the nego-
tiation process. Thus, members do not leave/enter the team as the negotiation
is being carried out. It is acknowledged that team members may leave or join
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Fig. 1. This picture shows our general negotiation framework.
the group in certain specific situations. However, membership dynamics is not
considered in this article, and it is designated as future work.
3 Intra-team strategies
In this section we briefly describe the intra-team strategies proposed by Sanchez-
Anguix et al. [24,23] that are the focus of our study. These intra-team strate-
gies have been selected according to the minimum level of unanimity that they
are able to guarantee regarding each team decision: no unanimity guaranteed
(representative), majority/plurality (similarity simple voting), semi-unanimity
(similarity Borda voting), and unanimity (full unanimity mediated).
3.1 Representative (RE)
The intra-team protocol employed by the representative intra-team strategy is
the simplest possible strategy for a negotiation team. Basically, one of the team
members is selected as representative and acts on behalf of the team. Interactions
among team members are non-existent, and therefore, every decision is taken by
the representative according to its own criterion. Obviously, the performance
of the team will be determined by the similarity among the team members’
utility functions and the negotiation skills of the representative. It is expected
that if team members’ utility functions are very similar and the representative
negotiation strategy is appropriate, the team performance will be reasonably
good.
The mechanism used by the team to select its representative may vary de-
pending on the domain: trust, past experiences, rational voting based on who
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Fig. 2. Screenshot showing the menu for configuring a team negotiation session.
is more similar to oneself, etc. Since Genius is a general simulation framework,
a random team member is selected as representative. This random team mem-
ber will receive the messages from the opponent and act accordingly by sending
an offer/counter-offer or accepting the opponent’s offer. Generally, any Genius
agent that knows how to play the alternating bilateral game can act as repre-
sentative.
3.2 Similarity Simple Voting (SSV)
The similarity simple voting intra-team strategy relies on voting processes to
decide on which offer is proposed and whether or not the opponent’s offer is ac-
cepted. Being based on voting, the strategy requires the action of team members
and team coordination by means of a mediator. The intra-team strategy goes as
follows every round:
– Accept/Reject opponents’ offer: The team mediator receives an offer from
the other party. Then, the mediator broadcasts this offer to the team mem-
bers, indicating that it comes from the opponent party. The team mediator
opens a voting process, where each team member should respond to the me-
diator with an Accept or Reject depending on the acceptability of the offer
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from the point of view of the team member. The team mediator gathers the
responses from every team member and applies a majority rule. If the num-
ber of Accept actions received from team members is greater than half the
size of the team, the offer is accepted and the corresponding Accept action is
sent to the opponent. Otherwise, the team mediator starts the offer proposal
mechanism.
– Offer Proposal: Each team member is allowed to propose an offer to be sent.
This offer is communicated solely to the mediator, who will make public
the offers, and start a voting process. In this voting process, each team
member must state whether or not he considers it acceptable for each of
the offers proposed. For instance, if three different offers (x1, x2, x3) have
been proposed, the team members should state about the acceptability of
the three of them: e.g., (yes, no, yes). The mediator applies a plurality rule
to determine the most supported offer, which is the one that is sent to the
opponent.
Standard team members for SSV employ time tactics to decide on the accep-
tance/rejection of the opponent’s offer, and the offer proposal. More specifically,
the current aspiration for team members follows the next expression [13]:
sai (t) = 1− (1−RUai)
(
t
TA
)1/βai
. (1)
where sai(t) is the utility demanded by the team member at time t, RUai is
the reservation utility for the agent, TA is the team’s deadline, and βai is the
concession speed. When βai < 1 we have a classic Boulware strategy, when
βai = 1 we have a linear concession, and when βai > 1 we have a conceder
strategy. On the one hand a team members considers an opponent’s offer as
acceptable if it reports a utility which is greater than or equal to sai(t). On
the other hand, a team member considers an offer proposed by a teammate
acceptable if it reports a utility which is greater than or equal to the utility
of the offer that he proposed to the team in the same round. As for the offer
proposed to the team, team members attempt to select the offer from the iso-
utility curve which is closer to the last opponent’s offer and the offer sent by the
team in the last round (similarity heuristic based on Euclidean distance).
3.3 Similarity Borda Voting (SBV)
This intra-team strategy attempts to guarantee a higher level of unanimity by
incorporating voting mechanisms that select broadly accepted candidates like
Borda count [19], and unanimity voting processes. The intra-team strategy pro-
ceeds as SSV with the following differences:
– Accept/Reject opponents’ offer: Instead of using a majority voting to decide
whether or not the opponent’s offer is accepted, the team mediator opens
a unanimity voting. Hence, an opponent offer is accepted if and only if the
number of Accept actions is equal to the number of team members. Other-
wise, the team mediator stars the offer proposal mechanism.
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– Offer Proposal: Each team member is allowed to propose an offer to be sent
by the same mechanisms described in SSV. Then, the team mediator makes
the team members privately score each proposal by means of a Borda count.
The team members give a different score to each offer from the set [0, |A|−1],
where |A| is the number of proposals received by the team mediator. Once
the scores have been received by the team mediator, it selects the candidate
offer that received the highest sum of scores and it is sent to the opponent.
Standard team members are governed by an individual time-based conces-
sion tactic like the one in Equation 1. Similarly to SSV, an opponent’s offer is
acceptable for a team member if the utility that it reports is equal to or greater
than its current utility demanded sai(t). When scoring team offers, each team
member privately ranks candidates in descending order of utility and then it
assigns a score to each offer which is equal to the number of candidates minus
the position of the offer in the ranking.
3.4 Full Unanimity Mediated (FUM)
FUM is capable of reaching unanimous decisions as long as the negotiation do-
main is composed by predictable issues whose type of valuation function is the
same for team members (e.g., either monotonically increasing or decreasing).
The type of unanimity that it is capable of guaranteeing is strict in the sense
that every decision reports a utility which is greater than or equal to the current
aspiration level of each team member [23]. The team mediator governs intra-team
interactions as follows:
– Accept/Reject opponents’ offer: The interaction protocol followed by the
team in this decision is the same as the one presented in SSV. However,
the decision rule applied by the team mediator in this case is unanimity.
Therefore, an opponent offer is only accepted if it is acceptable to each team
member.
– Offer Proposal: Every team member is involved in the offer proposal, which
consists in an iterated process where the offer is built attribute per attribute.
The mediator starts the iterated building process with an empty partial offer
(no attribute is set). Then, he selects the first attribute to be set following
an agenda. The mediator makes public the current partial offer and the at-
tribute that needs to be set. Each active team member states privately to
the mediator the value that he wants for the requested issue. When all of
the responses have been gathered, the mediator aggregates the values sent
by team members using the max (monotonically increasing valuation func-
tion) or min (monotonically decreasing valuation function) and makes public
among active team members the new partial offer. Since it is assumed that
team members share the same type of valuation function for predictable at-
tributes, increasing the welfare of one of the members results in other team
members increasing their welfare or staying at the same utility. Then, each
active team member must evaluate the partial offer and state if the partial
8 V. Sanchez-Anguix, R. Aydog˘an, V. Julian, C. M. Jonker
offer is acceptable at the current state (Accept or Reject action). Those team
members that respond with an Accept action are no longer considered active
in the current construction process. The team mediator selects the next at-
tribute in the agenda and follows the same process until all of the attributes
have been set or until there are no more active team members (the rest of
the attributes are maximized to match the opponent’s preferences). It should
be said that the agenda of attributes is set by the mediator observing the
concessions from the opponent in the first interactions. Following a rational
criteria, the opponent should have conceded less in the most important at-
tributes in the first negotiation rounds. The amount of concession in each
attribute during the first rounds is summed up and an attribute agenda is
inferred at each round. The first attributes in the agenda are those inferred
as less important for the opponent (more amount of concession), whereas
the last attributes in the agenda are those considered more important for
the opponent. The heuristic behind this agenda and iterated building pro-
cess is attempting to satisfy team members first with those attributes less
important for the opponent.
As for the standard team member behavior, team members have their de-
mands governed by an individual time-based concession tactic like the one in
Equation 1. In the iterated building process, each team member requests the at-
tribute value which, given the current partial offer, makes the partial offer closer
to its current demands sai(t). Additionally, a partial offer is acceptable when,
considering only those attributes that have been set, the partial offer reports a
partial utility which is greater than or equal to the current demands of the team
member. Each team members considers an opponent offer acceptable when it
has a utility which is greater or equal than its current demands sai(t).
4 Implementation in Genius
Genius [14] is a well-known negotiation simulation framework. It supports sim-
ulation of sessions and tournaments based on bilateral negotiations. Users are
able to design their own agents and test them against a wide variety of dif-
ferent agents designed by the community. The framework provides information
critical for analysis (e.g., utility, Pareto optimality, etc.) which is extremely use-
ful for research tasks. Moreover, the use of Genius as a testbed for bilateral
negotiations is testified by its use in the annual automated negotiating agent
competition (ANAC) [2]. The ANAC competition provided Genius with a large
repository of agents. The repository of available agents contains conceder, in-
verter, matcher, and competitor agents. The integration of ABNT in Genius
additionally facilitates the following objectives:
– The framework includes several negotiation domains and utility functions
for test purposes. Even though most of these domains are thought for bilat-
eral negotiations with unitary players, it is possible to add new negotiation
domains and utility functions in an easy way. In fact, we are in the process of
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adding new team negotiation domains (i.e., advanced hotel group booking)
besides the one employed for the experiments of this paper (i.e., hotel group
booking, see Section 5.2).
– The use of Genius in ANAC has provided with wide variety of conceder,
matcher, inverter and competitor opponents. Previous research in ABNT
had only considered opponents with time-based tactics [24].
– Current research in ABNT has only considered team members following the
same kind of homogeneous behavior inside the intra-team strategy, which
may not be the case in some open environments. Due to its open nature,
Genius may be able to simulate ABNT whose team members are heteroge-
neous since they have been designed by different scholars.
– Genius is a consolidated testbed among the agent community. Thus, the
inclusion of ABNT inside Genius can facilitate research on ABNT by other
scholars, and even give room to a future negotiating competition involving
teams.
– Researchers can either design new team members for teams following the
intra-team protocols included in the framework (i.e., team mediators), or
they can design new intra-team protocols and team members.
In order to implement negotiation teams, two new classes have been intro-
duced in Genius: TeamMediator and TeamMember. These two classes can be
extended by users to include new intra-team strategies and types of team mem-
bers in the system. Next, we depict the main traits of these classes, and how
they can be used to include new features in Genius:
– TeamMember : Team members extend the Agent class, so they have all of
their methods available. Actions that come from the opponent party are
received by the ReceiveMessage method, whereas actions that come from
the team mediator are received in the
ReceiveTeamMessage method. The method chooseAction is used to decide
the agent’s action independently of whether or not the next action involves
communications with the team mediator or the opponent.
– TeamMediator : The team mediator is the agent that communicates with the
opponent party, and transmits opponent’s decisions to the team members.
Thus, it has access to the public interface of all of the team members. De-
pending on the kind of intra-team strategy, the mediator also coordinates
other processes like voting mechanisms, offer proposal mechanisms, and so
forth. As the Agent class, it receives communications from opponent by the
ReceiveMessage method. In the chooseAction method, the mediator can ei-
ther directly send a decision to the opponent, or communicate with team
members to decide the next action to be taken. When interacting with team
members, the mediator uses the ReceiveTeamMessage method in team mem-
bers’ API to send messages to team members. Team members can respond to
the mediator with the chooseAction method in their public API. The Team-
Mediator class is completely flexible, as the only mandatory action is receiv-
ing opponent’s decisions and sending decisions to the other party. Therefore,
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any kind of mediated communication protocol can be implemented extending
the TeamMediator class.
Of course, it should be noted that team members and team mediators are
tightly coupled. For a team member to participate in a negotiation team gov-
erned by a specific mediator, the team members should know the intra-team
communication protocol implemented by such mediator.
Genius provides several measures to assess the quality of negotiating agents.
The current version of Genius is capable of running team negotiation sessions
between two parties and provide online information about the minimum utility
of team members, the average utility of team members, the maximum utility of
team members, the joint utility of team members, current round, and current
negotiation time for each offer exchanged between both parties. A screenshot of
the environment being configured for a team negotiation session can be observed
in Fig. 2. In the upper part of the menu, the user can select the intra-team
strategies to be used by each party, whereas the user add and remove team
members for each party in the lower part of the menu.
5 Experiments and Results
As stated in the Section 1, one of the purposes of this paper is assessing the per-
formance of intra-team strategies against negotiation strategies different from
classic time-based tactics. With that purpose, we tested RE, SSV, SBV and
FUM against agents from the ANAC 2010 competition who have been previ-
ously classified into competitors, conceders, and matchers3 [3]. First, we briefly
describe the agents that we selected from the agent competition to represent the
different families of negotiation strategies. Then, we introduce the negotiation
domain used for the experiments. After that, we describe how the experiments
were carried out, and, finally, we show and analyze the results of the experiments.
5.1 ANAC 2010 Agents
In this section we present the different ANAC 2010 agents employed for our
experiments. These agents pertain to three of the four categories presented pre-
viously: matchers, conceders, competitors.
– IAMHaggler & IAMCrazzyHaggler [32,2]: On the one hand, IAMCrazyHag-
gler is basically a take-or-leave it agent that proposes offers over a high
threshold. The only aspect taken into consideration for accepting an offer
is the utility of such offer, and not time. Due to this behavior, the experi-
ments carried out in [3] classified IAMCrazyHaggler as the most competitive
strategy in the ANAC 2010 competition. On the other hand, IAMHaggler
is a much more complicated agent. It employs Bayesian learning and non-
linear regression to attempt to model the opponent party and updates its
3 Because of the technical inconsistencies, we could not use ANAC’s inverters directly
in our settings. Thus, they are not included in this analysis.
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acceptance threshold based on information like time, the model of the oppo-
nent, and so forth. It was classified as a competitor agent in the experiments
carried out in [3]
– Agent Smith [31,2]: This agent is a conceder agent [3] that starts by demand-
ing the highest utility for himself and slowly concedes to attempt to satisfy
the preferences of the opponent by means of a learning heuristic. When the
timeline is approaching two minutes, it proposes the best offer received up
until that moment in an effort to finish the negotiation.
– Agent K [11,2]: This agent was the winner of the ANAC 2010 competition. It
adjusts its aspirations (i.e., target utility) in the negotiation process consid-
ering an estimation of the maximum utility that will be offered by the other
party. More specifically, the agent gradually reduces its target utility based
on the average utility offered by the opponent and its standard deviation. If
an offer has been proposed by the opponent that satisfies such threshold, it
is sent back since, rationally, it should be also good enough for the opponent.
In [3], Agent K was classified as a competitor agent.
– Nice Tit-for-Tat [10,3,4]: This strategy is a matcher agent from the 2011
ANAC competition that reciprocates the other party’s moves by means of a
Bayesian model of the other party’s preferences. According to the Bayesian
model, the Nice Tit-for-Tat agent attempts to calculate the Nash point and
it reciprocates moves by calculating the distance of the last opponent offer to
the aforementioned point. When the negotiation time is reaching its deadline,
the Nice TFT agent will wait for an offer that is not expected to improve in
the remaining time and accept it in order to secure an agreement.
5.2 Test Domain: Hotel Group Booking
A group of friends who have decided to spend their holidays together has to
book accommodation for their stay. Their destination is Rome, and they want
to spend a whole week. The group of agents engages in a negotiation with a
well-known hotel in their city of destination. Both parties have to negotiate the
following issues:
– Price per person (pp): The price per person to pay.
– Cancellation fee per person (cf): The fee that should be paid in case that
the reservation is cancelled.
– Full payment deadline (pd): It indicates when the group of friends has to
pay the booking.
– Discount in bar (db): As a token of respect for good clients, the hotel offers
nice discounts at the hotel bar.
In our experimental setup, preference profiles are represented by means of addi-
tive utility functions in the form:
Upi (X) = wpi,1Vpi,1 (x1) + ...+ wpi,nVpi,n (xn) . (2)
where wpi,j is the weight given by agent pi to attribute j, Vpi,j is the valuation
function for attribute j, and xj is the value of attribute j in the offer X. The
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wpd wcf wpd wdb
a1 0.5 0.1 0.05 0.35
a2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
a3 0.30 0.50 0.05 0.15
op 0.10 0.50 0.25 0.15
Table 1. Preference profiles used in the experiments. ai represents team members and
op represents the opponent.
domain of the attribute values is continuous and scaled to [0,1]. It should be
noted that all of the team members share the same type of monotonic valuation
function for the attributes (monotonically increasing for payment deadline and
discount, and decreasing for price and cancellation fee) so that there is potential
for cooperation among team members. Despite this, team members give different
weights to the negotiation issues. The type of valuation function for the opponent
is the opposite type (increasing for price and cancellation fee, and decreasing for
the payment deadline and the discount) and weights may be different too. The
preference profiles of the agents can be found in Table 1. Even though SSV, SBV,
and RE are able to handle other types of domain where unpredictable attributes
are present, we only use domains with predictable attributes in our analysis
because FUM does not support domains having unpredictable attributes.
5.3 Experimental Setting
In order to evaluate the performance of the intra-team strategies introduced in
Section 3, we set up a negotiation team consisting of three members that nego-
tiates with each ANAC agent presented in Section 5.1. We tested the intra-team
strategies with different parameters’ configurations: the FUM strategy where
the concession speed of each team member is drawn from the uniform distribu-
tion βai = U [0.5, 0.99] (FUM Boulware or FUM B) or βai = U [0.01, 0.4] (FUM
Very Boulware or FUM VB), the SSV strategy where βai = U [0.5, 0.99] (SSV
Boulware or SSV B) or βai = U [0.01, 0.4] (SSV Very Boulware or VB), the SBV
strategy where βai = U [0.5, 0.99] (SBV Boulware or SBV B) or βai = U [0.01, 0.4]
(SBV Very Boulware or VB), and the representative approach employing Agent
K as the negotiation strategy (RE K). Both parties have a shared deadline
T = 180 seconds. If the deadline is reached and no final agreement has been
found, both parties get a utility equal to 0.
In the experiments, each intra-team strategy was faced against each ANAC
agent 10 different times to capture stochastic differences in the results. Out of
those 10 repetitions, half of the times the initiating party was the team, and the
other half the initiating party was the ANAC agent. We gathered information on
the average utility of team members in the final agreement, and the joint utility
of both parties (product of utilities of team members and opponent). A one-way
ANOVA (α = 0.05) and a post-hoc analysis with Tukey’s test was carried out
to assess the differences in the averages.
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Competitive Matcher Conceder
Crazy Haggler K TFT Smith
FUM B 0.19 0.38 0.29 0.72 0.68
FUM VB 0.16 0.42 0.65 0.72 0.97
RE K 0.00 0.26 0.57 0.70 0.86
SSV B 0.14 0.34 0.36 0.45 0.57
SSV VB 0.08 0.36 0.57 0.44 0.98
SBV B 0.14 0.35 0.31 0.49 0.55
SBV VB 0.13 0.39 0.59 0.50 0.98
Table 2. The table shows the average of the average utility for team members in the
final agreement. Crazy: IAMCrazyHaggler, Haggler: IAMHaggler,K: Agent K, TFT:
Nice Tit-for-Tat, Smith: Agent Smith, B: β = U [0.5, 0.99], VB: β = U [0.01, 0.49]
5.4 Results
One of the goals of this paper is identifying which intra-team strategies work
better against different opponents. Therefore, we start by analyzing the results
for the average utility of team members in Table 2. The results in bold fond
indicate which intra-team strategy obtains statistically better results according
to ANOVA (α = 0.05) and post-hoc analysis with Tukey’s test. As expected,
all of the intra-team strategies, especially when their concession speed is very
boulware, get higher average utility for team members while negotiating with an
opponent employing a conceder strategy like Agent Smith than while negotiating
with competitive opponents like AgentK, IAMHaggler, and IAMCrazyHaggler.
This result supports the observation of [3] that a successful negotiating agent, if
we only consider a single negotiation with the opponent (short term relationship),
should behave competitively, especially against cooperative strategies.
When the opponent is a conceder (Agent Smith), we observe that, in our
experiments, the best intra-team strategies are those that wait as much as pos-
sible to concede and exploit the opponent. We refer to FUM, SBV, and SSV
strategies employing a very Boulware time tactic (FUM VB, SBV VB, and SSV
VB). FUM VB, SBV VB, and SSV VB statistically get the same average for the
average utility of team members4. This can be explained due to the fact that
the conceder agent has fully conceded before FUM, SBV, and SSV VB have
started to concede. Since a concession from the opponent generally results in all
of the team members increasing their welfare, these intra-team strategies per-
form similarly even though they ensure different levels of unanimity regarding
team decisions. A representative using agent K also performs reasonably well
due to the same reason. However, since only one of the team members takes
decisions, it may not reach an average utility comparable to the ones obtained
by FUM VB, SBV VB, and SSV VB.
When the opponent is a matcher, it is observed that employing FUM strate-
gies (B and VB) and a representative strategy with a competitor representa-
4 One-way ANOVA alpha=0.05 and a post-hoc Tukey test was carried out to support
our claims.
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tive (RE K) results in higher average utility for the team than employing SSV
and SBV strategies (B and VB). According to the one-way ANOVA test, the
performances of FUM strategies (B and VB) and RE K are statistically and
significantly better than those of SSV and SBV strategies (B and VB). The fact
that SSV and SBV do not guarantee unanimity regarding team decisions has an
important impact on the average utility of team members when faced against
Nice Tit-for-Tat. There are no significant differences between FUM B, FUM
VB, and RE K. Even though using an Agent K representative guarantees less
unanimity regarding team decisions than other intra-team strategies, it is shown
that, against certain types of opponents, a representative with a competitor ne-
gotiation strategy may be enough in practice to achieve results comparable to
results obtained by strategies that guarantee unanimity like FUM.
When the opponent is a competitor, team strategies that employ FUM VB,
SBV VB, and SSV VB perform better than their correspondents, FUM B, SBV
B, and SSV B respectively. That is, if the opponent is competitive, taking a
competitive approach and conceding less results in better average team utility
than taking cooperative approaches. In any case, we can observe that the average
utility obtained by team members in some competitive settings (i.e., against
Haggler and IAMCrazyHaggler) is way lower than the one obtained by the same
intra-team strategies against conceders or matchers. This suggests the necessity
to explore new intra-team strategies that are able to cope with some competitor
agents. If we compare the performances of FUM VB, SBV VB, and SSV VB,
the results show that the team using FUM VB gathers higher utility on average
than the rest of the cases. The fact that FUM approaches are usually the best
options may be explained due to the fact that it ensures that all of the team
members are satisfied with those offers sent to the opponent and offers sent by
the opponent. Note that when the opponent is IAMCrazyHaggler, which is a
take it or leave it strategy, FUM B gets a higher average for the average utility
of team members, but there is no statistically and significant difference with the
second runner, FUM VB. In any case, FUM B is statistically different that the
rest of intra-team strategies. In this case, RE K is not capable of retaining an
average utility for team members comparable to FUM VB, SBV VB, and SSV
VB. In fact, all of the negotiations between RE K and IAMCrazyHaggler failed.
Our second evaluation metric is the joint utility of the final agreement5. The
joint utility of all of the participants is a crucial metric in situations where both
parties not only want to get a deal, but also build a long term relationship
and engage in multiple negotiations in the future. An agent that has been ex-
ploited in the negotiation process may be reluctant to negotiate with the same
team/opponent in the future. Table 2 shows the average for the joint utility
in the final agreement. The best intra-team strategies for each opponent in the
average utility case, are also the best intra-team strategies in the joint utility
case. The only exception to this rule is the conceder case. In that scenario, the
best results are obtained by employing FUM with a Boulware strategy instead
of exploiting the opponent with very Boulware strategies (FUM VB, SSV VB).
5 The product of the utilities of each team member and the opponent
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Competitive Matcher Conceder
Crazy Haggler K TFT Smith
FUM B 0.005 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.16
FUM VB 0.004 0.06 0.15 0.17 0.04
RE K 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.15 0.09
SSV B 0.002 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10
SSV VB 0.001 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.02
SBV B 0.002 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09
SBV VB 0.002 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.02
Table 3. The table shows the average for the joint utility (product) of team members
and opponent in the final agreement.
Thus, if a long term relationship is to be built with conceder agents, it may be
wise to employ more concessive intra-team strategies. Very Boulware strategies
exploit the opponent, and get very high results for the average utility of team
members, but they do not allow the opponent to get high utilities, which results
in low joint utilities. On average the highest joint utility is gathered when the
team employs a FUM strategy against to a matcher opponent namely, Nice Tit
for Tat. Since a matcher matches its opponent, TFT matches its behavior with
FUM. Even if FUM concedes slowly over time, TFT will also concede, preclud-
ing both parties from being exploited. In competitive settings, FUM needs to
adjust its concession speed (very Boulware for IAMHaggler and Agent K, and
Boulware for IAMCrazyHaggler) to be able to get the most for the joint utility,
and, still, the results are specially low against Hagglers. This again suggests the
necessity to explore new intra-team strategies that are able to cope with some
competitor agents.
6 Related Work
The artificial intelligence community has focused on bilateral or multi-party
negotiations where parties are composed of single individuals. The most relevant
difference in our work is that we consider multi-individual parties. Next, we
analyze and discuss work related in artificial intelligence.
First, we review some relevant work in bilateral negotiations. Faratin et al. [7]
introduced some of the most widely used families of concession tactics in negoti-
ation. The authors proposed concession strategies for negotiation issues that are
a mix of different families of concession tactics. The authors divide these conces-
sion tactics into three different families: (i) time-dependent concession tactics;
(ii) behavior-dependent concession tactics; and (iii) resource-dependent tactics.
Our negotiation framework also considers time as crucial element in negotiation.
Therefore, team members employ time tactics inspired in those introduced by
Faratin et al.. In another work, Lai et al. [13] propose an extension of the clas-
sic alternating bargaining model where agents are allowed to propose up to k
different offers at each negotiation round. Offers are proposed from the current
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iso-utility curve according to a similarity mechanism that selects the most similar
offer to the last offer received from the opponent. This present work also consid-
ers extending the bilateral alternating protocol by included layers of intra-team
negotiation among team members. This way, team members can decide on the
actions that should be taken during the negotiation. Robu et al.[21,20] introduce
a bilateral negotiation model where agents represent their preferences by means
of utility graphs. Utility graphs are graphical models that represent binary de-
pendencies between issues. The authors propose a negotiation scenario where
the buyer’s preferences and the seller’s preferences are modeled through utility
graphs. The seller is the agent that carries out a more thorough exploration of
the negotiation space in order to search for agreements where both parties are
satisfied. With this purpose, the seller builds a model of the buyer’s preferences
based on historic information of past deals and expert knowledge about the ne-
gotiation domain. Differently to this work, we introduce multi-individual parties
and add layers of intra-team negotiation to make it possible for team members
to decide on which actions to take during the negotiation.
With regards to multi-party negotiations, several works have been proposed
in the literature [6,12,18,1,9,33,15]. For instance, Ehtamo et al. [6] propose a
mediated multi-party negotiation protocol which looks for joint gains in an it-
erated way and a single agreement should be found to satisfy all of the parties.
The algorithm starts from a tentative agreement and moves in a direction ac-
cording to what the agents prefer regarding some offers’ comparison. Klein et al.
[12] propose a mediated negotiation model which can be extended to multiple
parties negotiating the same agreement. Similarly, Ito et al. [9] propose different
types of n-ary utility functions and efficient multiparty models for multiple par-
ties negotiating on the same agreement. Marsa-Maestre et al. [16,17] carry out
further research in the area of negotiation models for complex utility functions.
More specifically, they extend the constraint based model proposed by Ito et al.
[9] by proposing different bidding mechanisms for agents. One-to-many negotia-
tions and many-to-many negotiations also represent special cases of multi-party
negotiations. One-to-many negotiations represent settings where one party ne-
gotiates simultaneously with multiple parties. It can be a party negotiating in
parallel negotiation threads for the same good with different opponent parties
[18,1,33,15] or a party that negotiates simultaneously with multiple parties like
in the Contract-Net protocol, and the English and Dutch auction [27,25,26].
Many-to-many negotiations consider the fact that many parties negotiate with
many parties, the double auction being the most representative example [26].
Differently to the aforementioned concepts, negotiation teams are not related
with the cardinality of the parties but the nature of the party itself. When ad-
dressing a negotiation team, we consider a negotiation party that is formed by
more than a multiple individuals whose preferences have to be represented in
the final agreement. This complex negotiation party can participate in bilateral
negotiations, one-to-many negotiations, or many-to-many negotiations. The rea-
son to model this complex negotiation party instead of as multiple individual
parties is the potential for cooperation. Despite having possibly different indi-
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vidual preferences, a negotiation team usually exists because there is a shared
common goal among team members which is of particular importance.
As far as we are concerned, only our previous works [24,23,22,28] have con-
sidered negotiation teams in computational models. More specifically, the four
different computational models introduced in this article are analyzed in dif-
ferent negotiation conditions when facing opponents governed by time tactics.
However, the analysis does not include variability with respect to the strategy
carried out by the opponent like the experiments carried out in this present
article.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents preliminary results on the performance of existing intra-
team strategies for bilateral negotiations against heterogeneous opponents: com-
petitors, conceders, and matchers. According to our analysis, the intra-team
strategies like Full Unanimity Mediated (FUM), Similarity Borda Voting (SBV),
Simple Similarity Voting (SSV) and Representative (RE) are able to negotiate
with different success against different types of heterogeneous opponents. For
the average utility of team members on the final agreement and the joint utility
of both parties, we found similar results. In the case of conceders, FUM, SBV,
and SSV seems the best options as long as they wait for the opponent to con-
cede and exploit conceders. In the case of matchers, using either FUM or RE
employing Agent K’s negotiation strategy seem the best choices. This suggests
that, for certain types of opponents, a representative approach with an appropri-
ate negotiation strategy may be enough in practice. Finally, the results against
competitors show that while strategies like FUM obtain reasonably good re-
sults against some competitors like Agent K, all of them suffer from exploitation
against other competitor agents like IAMHaggler and IAMCrazyHaggler. Since
existing intra-team strategies such as FUM, SBV, and SSV employ time tactics,
they are inclined to concede during the negotiation. This may suggest that new
intra-team strategies are needed to tackle negotiations against a broader set of
competitors.
Additionally, we have extended the well-known negotiation testbed, GENIUS
to support bilateral negotiations where at least one of the parties is a team. The
extension allows developers to design their own intra-team strategies by extend-
ing the type of mediator used by the team and the type of team member. We
expect that by extending GENIUS with negotiation teams, the research in ne-
gotiation teams will further advance and facilitate research.
For future work, we consider designing intra-team negotiation strategies that
analyze the behavior of opponent and act accordingly. If a team understands that
the opponent is cooperative, the team may act cooperatively and find a mutually
acceptable agreement early. Otherwise, if the opponent is a competitor, the team
may decide to take a strong position and not concede during the negotiation.
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